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INTRODUCTION

Grey market goods, or parallel imports, are genuine, goods man-

ufactured and sold abroad under a genuine trademark.2 Distributors
import these products into the United States to compete with goods
owned by the American holder of the identical trademarkA The cost
savings on a Mercedes Benz 500, retailing for $53,000 in a United
States showroom, represents a parallel importation situation. The
same automobile purchased on the grey market can be purchased in
Germany, shipped to America, and prepared to meet government

safety standards for $37,000. 4 Although legislation,r judicial analysis,6

and legal commentary7 have addressed grey market goods for more
than a century,8 the recent strength of the United States dollar in

1. Genuine goods are products with a trademark that "signifies the same source of origin
as that which it normally means to the purchasing public." Vandenburgh, The Problem of
Importationof Genuinely Marked Goods Is Not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP.
707, 713 (1949).
2. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1055 (1986).
3. Id. See also Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Custom Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416, 418
(S.D. Fla. 1983) ("goods produced by a foreign manufacturer and bearing that manufacturer's
trademark, which are purchased abroad and imported into this country by persons other than
the manufacturer's authorized United States distributor"); 2 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30.35 (2d ed. 1984) ("[Slomeone other than the designated exclusive
United States importer buys genuine trademarked goods outside the U.S. and imports them
for sale in the U.S. in competition with the exclusive U.S. importer."); Victor, Preventing
Importation of Products in Violation of Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 783, 790 (1984)
("[G]ray market goods are genuinely produced and trademarked goods that are sold outside of
their authorized distribution channels."); Comment, Grey Market Imports: Stemming the Tide,
65 OR. L. REV. 123, 123 (1986) ("Grey market goods are goods.., imported into the United
States, and sold to American consumers by persons other than the manufacturers authorized
United States distributor.").
4. Comment, The Seven Billion Dollar Gray Market: Trademark Infringement or Honest
Competition?, 18 PAC. L.J. 261, 261-62 (1986).
5. See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
6. See Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (the Supreme Court first addressed
the grey market controversy); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916)
(universality principle applied to federal legislation governing importation); Apollinaris Co. v.
Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (universality principle applied to parallel imports in
common law trademark infringement claim).
7. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV. 813
(1927) (examination of trademark law including parallel importation).
8. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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foreign markets" has activated the grey market,o kindling litigation"
and discussions regarding parallel importation.
American trademark owners, attempting to exclude grey market
goods from the United States, argue that permitting importation of
these goods misleads consumers,"3 permits vendors of parallel imports
4
to unfairly profit from the American trademark holders' goodwill,
and violates the fundamental principles of trademark protection. 15 Although a number of legal avenues are available to United States

trademark owners seeking to halt parallel importation, 6 claims for
relief are most frequently 17 brought under section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (the Genuine Goods Exclusion Act).' s This statute prohibits
9. Baldo, Score One for the Gray Market, FORBES, Feb. 25, 1985, at 74.
10. Id. Grey market retailers are able to purchase genuine goods abroad and import them
for resale in the United States in competition with the exclusive American distributors. Id.
11. See, e.g., NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1986) (directing
American distributors to proceed under the Tariff Act, § 526, to obtain protection against parallel
importers), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 152 (1987); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315
(2d Cir. 1986) (Customs regulations held valid due to Congress' acquiescence to Customs' actions
towards § 526); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of United States Trademarks (COPIAT) v.
United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.) (Customs regulations held invalid as abuse of Customs

Service's authority to interpret § 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642
(1986); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985 (Customs regulations held
valid as-within Customs' discretion), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); Bell & Howell: Mamiya
Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (irreparable harm required for American
distributor to obtain preliminary injunction under § 526).
12. See, e.g., Coggio, Gordon, & Coruzzi, The History and Present Stats of Gray Goods,
75 TRADEMARK REP. 433 (1985) (review of legislative, regulatory, and judicial history of gray
goods, including recent cases); Lipner, Gray Market Goulash: The Problem of At-the-Border
Restrictions on Importation of Genuine TrademarkedGoods, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103 (1987)
(discussion of COPIAT, Vivitar, and Olympus, with proposed solutions to the dilemma); Note,
The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity
of Customes Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (1985) (criticism of the
Customs regulations); Comment, supra note 4 (discussion of factors activating the grey market,
along with the judicial and legislative development of the conflict).
13. See Note, supra note 12, at 84; see also infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
14. See Note, supra note 12, at 86; see also infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
16. Available remedies include, but are not limited to, the following- relief and damages
for trademark infringement under §§ 32 & 42 of the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 88 1114 &
1124 (1984); directing Customs to bar importation of grey market goods under § 526(a) of the
Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982); relief for unfair competition by petition to the International
Trade Commission under § 337(a) of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982).
17. The majority of the cases analyzed for this note contain claims for relief brought under
19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
18. The relevant part of this statute provides as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or
receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or asso-
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grey market goods import when certain requirements are met. 19 Gen-

erally, courts literally observe section 526 as the selected method of
tolling the flow of parallel imports across American borders. °
Grey marketeers argue that the goods should freely enter the
stream of commerce and that policies of fair and free competition2l
encourage importing such goods into the United States. 22 They argue
that the United States Customs Service's interpretation 23 of section
526 should apply.? The Customs regulations, which expand administration of section 526, provide that when the grey marketeer and the
American trademark owner have a corporate relationship,25 the statute
does not allow the American trademark holder to block the grey market goods entry.26 Recent litigation has discussed the Customs Serciation created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States, . ..and if a
copy of the certificate or registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary
of the Treasury, . ..unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is
produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
19. Id. These requirements include registration of the American trademark with the Patent
and Trademark Office, filing a copy of this registration with the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the absence of the American trademark holder's written consent. Id.
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. Note, The Gray Market Case: Trademark Rights v. Consumer Interests, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 838, 852 (1986).
22. Id. at 839.
23. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1986).
24. The relevant part of these regulations provides as follows:
Restrictions on importation of articles bearing recorded trademarks and trade
names ...
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States... are subject
to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraph[s] ...
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control...;
control... ;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner; ....
19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1986).
25. Id. Examples of such a relationship are found in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3).
26. Id. § 133.21(c). The restriction of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b) is inapplicable if any of the
relationships listed in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) exist. These exceptions to section 526 are apparently
the result of ambiguities in two phrases in the statutes: 'merchandise of foreign manufacture"
and "owned by."
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vice's interpretation of section 52627 and the United States Supreme
Court is currently deciding its fate.28
This note provides a brief history of the parallel imports dilemma,
tracing both the legislation and judicial decisions which developed this
controversy. Additionally, this note examines the impact of these historical developments on modern grey market goods cases. In determining which, if either, approach to the controversy lawmakers should
follow, this note analyzes policy considerations each side offers. The
note also determines which approach better upholds the basic principles upon which courts have historically based trademark protection.
Finally, this note anticipates the United States Supreme Court's decision on the grey market controversy, and concludes that until Congress
creates a feasible compromise between the two approaches, the Supreme Court should invalidate the Customs regulations and follow the
strict letter of section 526.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREY MARKET CONTROVERSY
A.

The History and Functions of Trademarks

Legal trademark protection indicating the ownership and source of
goods9 has developed since the early nineteenth century 0 The federal
Lanham Act codifies the modern definition of a trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device.., adopted and used by a manufacturer
or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish his goods, including
a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 3' 1

27. E.g., Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (Customs regulations
held valid due to Congress' acquiescence to Customs' actions); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity
of United States Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.) (Customs
regulations held invalid as abuse of Custom Service's authority to interpret § 526 of the 1930
Tariff Act), cert. granted, 107 S..Ct. 642 (1986); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (Customs regulations held valid as within Customs' discretion), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
28. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the COPIAT case on Oct. 6, 1987. 56
U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1987).
29. 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5.1 (2d ed. 1984).
30.

P.

GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE Doc-

TRINES 276 (2d ed. 1981).

31. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). The federal Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §9 1051-1127
(1982). See also McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1878) ("[A] trade-mark may consist of
a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if adopted and used'by a manufacturer ... to
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Unlike patents and copyrights, for which the United States Constitution provides specific protection, Congress' power to provide and
regulate trademark protection for American citizensm is indirectly inferred from the commerce clause of the Constitution.m
Trademarks perform four basic functions.m First, trademarks identify a seller's goods and distinguish them from goods sold by others.36
Second, consumers presume all goods bearing a trademark come from
a single source.3 7 Third, trademarks ensure that all goods bearing the
trademark are of the same quality38 Fourth, trademark holders use
trademarks to advertise and sell the goods.' 9 Additionally, trademarks
symbolize the goodwill 40 businesses have developed. This goodwill
plays a prominent role in the grey market goods controversy, 41 as
seen in early parallel importation cases.
B. The Early Grey Market Goods Cases: The Universality Theory
The first significant parallel importation case, Apollinaris Co. v.
Scherer,- followed the universality trademark theory. 43 Under the
universality theory, goods bearing a lawful trademark may be transported to any nation without infringing upon the exclusive rights of
the owner of the identical trademark in the country the goods enter.4
In Apollinaris, the plaintiff owned an exclusive right to import mineral
water into the United States. 45 The manufacturer of the product refused to grant the defendant, another American importer, the right
to also import this product. 46 The defendant later purchased the min-

designate the goods... manufacture[d]... to distinguish the same from those manufactured
or sold by another, ...to enable him to secure such profits as result from his reputation.
."). Id.

32.
33.
1332(c)
34.

8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.
Corporations are included in the definition of a United States citizen. 28 U.S.C. §
(1982).
3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

35.

1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 29, at § 3.1.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at § 3.2.
Id. at § 3.3.
Id. at § 3.4.
Id. at § 3.P.
See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
Coggio, Gordon, & Coruzzi, supra note 12, at 445-46.
Note, supra note 12, at 107.
27 F. at 19.
Id. at 18.
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eral water from a German distributor and imported it into the United
47
States to compete with the plaintiff.
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York concluded
the facts did not entitle the plaintiff to make a valid trademark infringement claim,4 1 and refused to grant a pxeliminary injunction restraining
the defendant from importing the water into the United States. 49 While
the plaintiff had a valid trademark worthy of common law protection
from unauthorized use,5 the court found the real issue was whether
the defendant unlawfully interfered with the plaintiffs exclusive rights
to sell the mineral water in the United States.5 ' Although the defendant's direct competition affected the plaintiffs ability to control the
52
water's price, the defendant did not act unlawfully or dishonestly.
The court ruled that a trademark merely denotes whether a product
is authentic, but does not protect an exclusive right to sell that product. r Since both parties in Apollinaris sold the genuinely trademarked
mineral water,5 the court refused to grant the plaintiff any relief.
The Apollinaris court applied the universality theory to common
law claims for trademark infringement4 In 1905, Congress passed
legislation forbidding the importation of goods which copied or simulated American-owned trademarks.5 7 Congress, however, did not expressly state whether the universality theory applied to federally registered trademarks.58
C.

The Birth of The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit planted the seed which
eventually blossomed into the conflict between section 526 of the Tariff

47. Id. at 19.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 19, 22.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 20.
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 20. 'There is no exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol ... except to
denote the authenticity of the article with which it has become identified by association. The
name has no office except to vouch for the genuineness of the thing which it distinguishes..
" Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 22.
56. Id. at 19.
57. "[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of any
domestic manufacture... shall be admitted to entry at any custom-house of the United States
." Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724.
58. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 5

440

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Act and the Customs regulations in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel.59 In
Katzel, the plaintiff purchased the American trademark registrations
and goodwill of a French face powder6O and imported the product for
sale in the United States. 61 Defendant, a Northeast pharmacy owner,6 2

imported the face powder into America for sale in her stores to compete
with the plaintiff.r As in Apollinaris,64 the court ruled that genuine
goods could enter the flow of United States commerce and denied
the permanent injunction.6 The plaintiff then appealed the Second
Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court.6 7
Responding to the Second Circuit's adoption of the Apollinaris
trend,6 Congress and the Supreme Court both addressed the parallel

importation controversy. While the Supreme Court deliberated over
the Katzel case, 69 the United States Congress enacted section 526 of

the Tariff Act. 70 Although Congress did not intend to limit section 526
to the Katzel facts, 71 the case sparked Congress' drive to expand the

59. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
60. 275 F. at 539-40.
61. Id. at 539.
62. Id. at 540.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
65. 275 F. at 540, 543.
66. Id. at 543.
67. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
68. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
69. The Katzel Second Circuit decision is dated June 30, 1921. 275 F. at 539. Section 526
was enacted into law on Sept. 21, 1922. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975.
The Supreme Court decided Katzel on Jan. 29, 1923. 260 U.S. at 689.
70. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356,'§ 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975.
71. The Senate debate over § 526 lasted 10 minutes. 62 CONG. REC. 11,585 (1922). The
entire Conference Report addressing the statute reads as follows:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing law does
not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the same trade-mark as merchandise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is genuine and if there
is no fraud upon the public. The Senate amendment makes such importation unlawful without the consent of the owner of the American trade mark, in order to
protect the American manufacturer or producer; and the House recedes with an
amendment requiring that the trade mark be owned, at the time of the importation,
by a citizen of the United States or by a corporation or association created or
organized within the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922). See also 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-03 (1922)
(statement of Senator Kellogg that § 526 was to apply to all goods, including goods manufactured
in America, exported to another nation, and subsequently imported into the United States); but
see Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y.) (Judge Learned Hand's
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scope of American trademark owners' protection. Rather than limiting goods which Customs could halt to those which "copy or simulate"7
American trademarks, section 526 simply requires that the United
States trademark owner register the mark with the Patent and
Trademark Office 4 and record the registration with the Treasury Department.7 5 Thus, Congress statutorily repealed Katzel and its predecessors76 which applied the universality theory to grey market goods
cases.
The United States Supreme Court, without referring to section
526, also reversed Katzel.7 Justice Holmes emphasized that the Katzel
plaintiff invested a substantial sum of money to promote its product. 7
Further, the American public believed that products bearing plaintiffs
trademark belonged to the plaintiff.7 9 This represented the first judicial
recognition of the value of the American trademark owner's goodwill. 80
The Court specifically addressed the genuine goods issue, holding that
authentic goods could infringe upon an American trademark holder's
rights in the same manner as non-genuine goods,
Although Congress and the Supreme Court used different
rationales 2 to solve the problems with the Second Circuit's Katzel
opinion, both entities replaced the universality principle with the territoriality theory of trademark protection. 2 The territoriality principle
recognizes that a "trademark has a separate legal existence under
each country's laws, and that its proper function is not necessarily to
specify the origin . . . of a good . . . but rather to symbolize the

statement that "Section 526(a) ... was intended only to supply the casus omissus, supposed
to exist in section 27 of the Act of 1905... , because of the decision of the Circuit Court of

Appeals in Bourjois v. Katzel .... Had the Supreme Court reversed... last spring, it would
not have been enacted."), affd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923).
72. Prior to enactment of § 526, there was no congressional legislation addressing the

exclusion of genuine goods. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
73. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592,'§ 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730.
74.

Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975.

75. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
260 U.S. 689 (1923).
Id. at 691.
Id.
Coggio, Gordon, & Coruzzi, supra note 12, at 450.
260 U.S. at 691.

82. Congress, in enacting § 526, provided protection to American trademark owners regardless of the establishment of goodwill. The Supreme Court, in Katzel, protected American

trademark owners who have developed goodwill. Coggio, Gordon, & Coruzzi, supranote 12, at
450.
83.

Note, supra note 12, at 107-08 n.144.
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domestic goodwill of the domestic markholder. '' Thus, the focus in
parallel importation cases shifted from determining the goods' origin
to resolving whether the grey marketeer unfairly took advantage of
the American trademark owner's local goodwill.

5

However, the con-

troversy surrounding grey market goods was just beginning to erupt.
D. Section 526 and the Customs Regulations: Consistently
Inconsistent Through the Years

Although Congress considered altering the language of section 526
on several occasions,1 the statute's scope remains unchanged since its
initial passage in 1922.8 The Customs Service's interpretation of section 526, however, commonly referred to as the Customs regulations,88
has undergone many inconsistent changes since the Treasury Department first issued the regulations in 1923.8 The first regulations merely
recognized that American trademark owners were entitled to section

84. 0sawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
85. Note, supra note 21, at 841.
86. Congress reenacted § 526 in the Tariff Act of 1930. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV,
§ 526, 46 Stat. 590, 741. In 1954, an attempt to narrow the amount of protection afforded
American trademark owners failed. H.R. 9476, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. 2540, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 36 (1954). Additionally, a 1959 effort to repeal the entire section did not garner enough
support to succeed. Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1078
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). This latter proposal was a response to
the 1957 Southern District of New York decision in United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F.
Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). In Guerlain, the Justice Department contended that American
trademark holders' use of § 526 to exclude genuine goods violated antitrust principles found in
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 79-80. The court agreed with the government's contention that
the United States mark holders had monopolized or attempted to monopolize the goods sold
under the trademark, stating that intraband competition in the subject goods was prevented.
Id. at 85-88. After obtaining this favorable result from the Court, the Justice Department
requested that the Supreme Court overturn it, proposing with the Departments of Treasury,
State, and Commerce that Congress was the entity which could best resolve the issue. Guerlain,
Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958). Unfortunately for these executive branch departments, and despite the Guerlain holding, Congress refused to amend or repeal § 526. H.R.
7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). A proposed 1969 amendment to the Lanham Act included a
repeal of § 526, but as with all prior attempts, Congress refused to limit the protections that
the statute offers. S. Res. 3713, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 19,447 (1968). Amendments to § 526, providing (1) exemptions for imports for personal use and (2) procedures for
Customs to follow upon discovering counterfeit marks, also failed to limit the scope of the
statute. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)-(e) (1982).
87. See supra note 86.
88. See, e.g., Noite, supra note 12, at 83.
89. Id. at 98.
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526 protection.9 New regulations, issued with the 1930 reenactment
of section 526,91 expressly stated that the section permitted United
States trademark owners to exclude genuine goods.9
In 1936, the Customs Service's interpretation of section 526 contrasted with the statute's literal meaning.93 Customs used the universality view, limiting the scope of section 526 to goods copying or
simulating protected American trademarks. 4 Additionally, the regulations could not prohibit importation if the American trademark holder
and the grey marketeer were "owned by the same person, partnership,
association, or corporation." 95 Regulations issued in 1953 expanded
this relationship to include licensees. 96 However, 1959 regulations allowed grey marketeers to import without the American trademark
owner's consent only if the parallel importer was part of the "same
entity" as the mark owner. 7
In 1972, the Customs Service issued regulations which are in effect
today.9 These regulations contain the same provisions regarding the
American trademark owner and grey marketeer corporate relationship.9 The regulations expressly limit the United States trademark
holder's ability to stop importation if the relationship is either between

90.

Customs Regulations of 1923, art. 475-80, cited in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761

F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
91. Customs Regulations of 1931, art. 513(a), cited in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761
F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
92. Id.
93. T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 337 (1936).
94. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1055 (1986).
95. T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 337 (1936). The United States Tariff Commission
reported that the corporate relationship reference did not apply to § 526, because "[slection 526
...does apply to the merchandise of the trade-mark owner which bears his trade-mark if the
merchandise was produced abroad and if the trade-mark owner is a citizen of the United States."
An Act to Providefor the Registration and Protection of Trade marks Used in Commerce, to
Carry Out the Provisionsof CertainInternationalConventions, and for Other Purposes:Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. of Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1944),
cited in Note, supra note 12, at 99 n.90.
96. 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1953), T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 383-84 (1953).
97. 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1959), T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 433-34 (1959).
98. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a), (b), (c)(1)-(3) (1985). For relevant portions of these regulations,
see supra note 24.
99. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1985). For purposes of this section, common ownership means
"individual or aggregate ownership of more that 50 percent of the business entity" and common
control means "effective control in policy and operations and is not necessarily synonymous with
common ownership". Id. § 133.2(d).
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parent and subsidiary corporations'00 or United States trademark licensors and licensees.11 Because the Customs Service constantly changed
its interpretation of a statute Congress never modified,' ° it is difficult
to determine whether the regulations validly interpret section 526.103
Four contemporary grey market goods caseso 4 address this issue, with
varying conclusions. °s
E. Recent ParallelImportation Cases:Are the Customs Regulations
Valid?
Following a nearly twenty-five year absence from the nation's courtrooms,' °6 grey market goods cases reappeared in the early 1980s. 107
Significantly, the United States dollar's strength in foreign markets1°8
led to this flurry of grey market activity.109 Courts have recently

100. Id. § 133.21(c)(2).
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
103. Courts deciding contemporary grey market cases have been divided as to the validity
of the regulations. See infra notes 112-71 and accompanying text.
104. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (Customs regulations
held valid due to Congress' acquiescence to Customs' actions); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity
of United States Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.) (Customs
regulations held invalid as abuse of Custom Service's authority to interpret § 526 of the 1930
Tariff Act), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (Customs regulations held valid as within Customs' discretion), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (Customs exceeded its authority in disseminating the regulations).
105. See infra notes 112-71 and accompanying text.
106. Coggio, Gordon, & Coruzzi, supra note 12, at 452.
107. See, e.g., NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 819 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1986) (regarding
importation of computer chips), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 152 (1987); Olympus Corp. v. United
States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (photographic equipment); COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 903 (group
of trademark owners seeking general relief); Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552 (photographic equipment);
Well Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D. N.J. 1985) (LLADRO ceramic
figurines); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(TRIvLIL PURSUIT games); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (women's shoes), rev'd, 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 71 (1987); Parfums Sterns, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.
Fla. 1983) (OscAR DE LA RENTA fragrances); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co.,
548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (photographic equipment), vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
108. Baldo, supra note 9, at 74; Nolan-Haley, The Competitive Process and Gray Market
Goods, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INVL & Comp. L. 231, 232 (1984).
109. Why Camera Prices are Falling, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 61, 64.
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decided four grey market cases, one analyzing the regulations" ° and
three directly addressing their validity."'
In Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo,"2 the plaintiff owned the
trademark rights for certain photographic equipment marks." 3 The
defendants were discount camera dealers importing photographic
4
equipment bearing trademarks identical to those the plaintiff owed."
The plaintiff sought an injunction barring the defendants from selling
the grey market goods." 5 The court ruled the plaintiff demonstrated
irreparable harm." 6 Factors establishing such injury included declining
sales,17 damage in consumers' views of the trademarker's reputation,"8s
and customer confusion arising from large price disparities and warranty services." 9 After stating that the plaintiff easily proved irreparable harm,20 the court analyzed the validity of the Customs regulations.Y1
Because the plaintiff and defendants in Osawa were separate legal
entities,22 the Customs regulations did not influence the court's decision.m However, in harsh dictum, the court questioned Cutoms' authority to issue such regulations.' 2 Concluding that Customs exceeded
its authority in disseminating the regulations,25 the court questioned
the "wisdom and necessity"'2 of the regulations. Although their validity was not at issue in Osawa,m the Customs regulations received a

110. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
111. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir 1986); COPIAT, 790 F.2d at
903, Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1551.
112. 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
113. Id. at 1164.
114. Id. at 1165.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1168-70.
117. Id. at 1168.
118. Id. at 1168-69.
119. Id. at 1169-70.
120. Id. at 1170.
121. Id. at 1177-78.

122. Separate entities do not fall under the "common ownership" or "common control"
definitions regarding application of the Customs regulations. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d), supra
note 99.
123. 589 F. Supp. at 1177.
124. Id. at 1177-78.
125. Id. at 1177.

126. Id.
127.

Id.
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stinging blow from the analysis. This analysis, however, did not convince all courts, since three casesm directly addressing the regulations
produced three different results.m
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States,10 plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment requiring Customs to follow the strict letter of section 526.131
The Court of International Trade refused to grant plaintiffs claim 32
and validated the Customs regulations. 13 On appeal, 134 the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the rationale validating the
regulations. 1' However, the court upheld the regulations because Congress could not have foreseen all potential scenarios arising from parallel importation,136 and the Customs Service had authority to place
"implied limitations ' s" upon enforcement of the Genuine Goods Exclusion Act. Citing cases which examined the facts before determining
whether to enforce section 526,"' the court concluded that the statute
should be developed on a case-by-case basis. 139
The United States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to
plaintiff,4 0 but granted certiorari in the next case to address the Customs regulations, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States.14 1 In COPIAT, the plaintiff,
a group of American trademark owners, sought the same declaratory
relief as the Vivitar plaintiff.142 The plaintiffs alleged that the Customs
regulations were inconsistent with section 526 and, therefore, in-

128.

Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Coalition to Preserve

the Integrity of United States Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
129. See infra notes 130-73 and accompanying text.
130. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
131. Id. at 1555.
132. Id.
133. Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 426-33.
134. Judge Nies wrote the Federal Circuit Court opinion. 761 F.2d at 1555.
135. Id. at 1565, 1568.
136. Id. at 1570.
137. Id.
138. See 761 F.2d at 1570 n.25 (list of cases).
139. Id. at 1570. The court stated that trademark owners must first pursue private remedies
authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982). Id. If successful, Judge Nies continued, then Vivitar
could have parallel imports stopped by Customs. Id.
140. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
141. 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
142. Compare 790 F.2d at 904 with Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1555 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (Vivitar sought a declaratory judgment requiring Customs to follow the strict letter

of § 526).
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valid. 4 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
denied COPIAT's claim for relief, validating the regulations as an
authorized interpretation of section 526.144 The court based its decision
on prior case law, the statute's legislative history, and Customs' con145
sistent policies regarding grey market goods.
The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit,
overturned the district court's ruling6 and concluded that "the regulations simply cannot be squared with section 526 and are thus invalid.

' 147

The majority held that an administrative agency such as

Customs may reasonably interpret a governing statute. 44 The court
believed section 526 had a clear legislative intent, and Customs therefore unreasonably interpreted the statute. 49 The court examined the
purpose of section 526,lm the statute's legislative history, 15' and the
subsequent Customs Service interpretations of section 526.152 The Customs regulations did not display, among other required characteristics, 11 the consistency needed for acceptance.'54 Illustrating this inconsistency was Customs' "poorly articulated and vacillating reasons"m
throughout the history of the regulations.
A third case addressing Customs' actions, Olympus v. United
States, took yet another view of the issue. 15 Shortly after COPIAT,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in principle with the
Vivitar decision,5 7 holding the Customs regulations valid. ' Unlike
COPIAT, which held that Customs acted erratically and inconsistently in interpreting section 526, 59 the Olympus court determined

143. 790 F.2d at 907.
144. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 598
F. Supp. 844, 845 (D.D.C. 1984).
145. Id.
146. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 908 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
149. Id. at 912-13.
150. Id. at 908-10.
151. Id. at 910-14.
152. Id. at 913-16.
153. Id. at 916. Other requirements include thoroughness and validity. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
157. For a discussion of Vivitar, see supra text accompanying notes 130-40.
158. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
159. For a discussion of COPIAT, see supra text accompanying notes 141-55.
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that the regulations consistently interpreted the statute.16r The plaintiff
in Olympus exclusively distributed a Japanese corporation's photographic equipment in America. 6 1 Plaintiff brought its action against
1'
the Treasury Department, attempting to eliminate the regulations,
63
and joined two potential grey marketeers of plaintiffs products.
Agreeing with Osawa that the regulations' validity was questionable, 6 the Olympus court held the interpretation was within Customs'
discretion as an administrative agency. 63 The court also agreed with
the Vivitar rationale that the regulations must be applied to the facts
on a case-by-case basis. 6 Unlike Vivitar's holding that Customs could
place "implied limitations" on the statute, 67 the Olympus majority
decided that Congress acquiesced to Customs' practices through its
silent reaction to the regulations.' 6s
Thus, two of three recently-decided cases addressing the grey market dilemma6 3 have upheld the Customs regulations based on differing
rationales, 170 and the third rejected the regulations outright.Y
Analyzed together, these three decisions present an unclear picture
of the grey market controversy. The United States Supreme Court,
by granting certiorari in COPIAT,"' has the opportunity to clarify
the situation. The Court will have to consider which, if either, approach
to the grey market better advances the fundamental principles underlying trademark protection. 73 The Supreme Court must decide
whether to favor the American trademark owners, the grey marketeers, or choose an alternative position which satisfies all interested
parties.

160.
161.

Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319.
Id. at 317.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 320.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
168. 792 F.2d at 320.
169. See supra notes 130-68 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of Vivitar, see supra text accompanying notes 130-40, and for a
discussion of Olympus, see supra text accompanying notes 164-76.
171. For a discussion of COPIAT, see supra text accompanying notes 149-63.
172. 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
173. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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449

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S CHALLENGE: WHO PREVAILS, THE
AMERICAN TRADEMARK OWNER OR THE GREY MARKETEER?

A. Side One: Section 526 Is a Reasonable Means of
Protecting Trademark Holders
Literally enforcing section 526 enables United States trademark
owners to completely halt the flow of parallel imports into America. 74
Literal enforcement maximizes protection offered trademark owners
in grey market situations by eliminating the possibility of customer
confusion 75 and harm to the trademark owner's goodwill. 176 Trademark
owners contend that grey market goods cause confusion among consumers regarding the products' source,' thus violating a basic function
of trademark protection. 178 Both consumers and the law presume all
goods bearing the same mark originate from the same source. 179 How-

ever, this presumption may be erroneous with parallel imports. By
failing to acknowledge that its products are not the exclusive American
distributor's products, the grey market misleads consumers to conclude
the American mark holder is the goods' source. 18
This customer confusion can lead to the breach of another fundamental principle of trademark protection, the guarantee of consistent
quality.',' When American consumers purchase grey market goods at
lower prices, 1 they are often surprised to discover that services provided with the American mark holder's goods, such as warranty coverage, 183 are not available with the parallel imports. 8 4 If the purchaser
buys the goods unaware that the product is a grey market good,"
the consumer will believe that the product and the trademark lack
quality.81 Further, the consumer's mistaken belief that the American
product's quality is deficient causes the trademark owner's goodwill
to suffer. 1'

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Note, supra note 21, at 858-61.
Note, supra note 12, at 84-87.
Id.
Id.
1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 29, at § 3.1.
Id. at § 3.3.
Note, supra note 21, at 855-57.
1 J McCARTHY, supra note 29, at 3.4.
Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at 233.
Id.
Id.
Note, supra note 21, at 856.
Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at 233.
Note, supra note 12, at 84.
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Goodwill is a business valuew that a trademark owner earns

through the mark holder's "reasonable expecta[tion] of preference in
the race of competition.' 18 9 Goodwill induces the public to purchase
goods bearing a particular trademark. Goodwill is the trademark
owner's asset, reflecting an investment to increase the mark's reputation and value. 1' If, as in Katzel, the American trademark owner
establishes itself as the source of the trademarked goods, then the
trademark owner is entitled to protection against grey market goods. 191
Therefore, literally administering section 526 provides American
trademark owners with protections they expect when they register
trademarks.' 92 Trademark owners expect that goods bearing their
194
mark originate from the same source,' 93 guarantee consistent quality,
and protect the goodwill associated with the trademark. 195 However,
literal enforcement may diminish American consumers' opportunity to
purchase merchandise in a market which is completely competitive.
Parallel importation advocates primarily advance this reduced competition argument.
B. The Flip Side: The Customs Regulations
Provide a Competitive Market for Consumers
One side of the Customs regulations debate desires protection of
American trademark owners' rights.19 However, courts must balance
this argument against American consumers' right to a highly competitive, deception-free market.'9 The deception-free market is a concept
borrowed from the trademark owners,1 9 and advocates consumer
awareness. The grey marketeers strongly argue that parallel importation benefits consumers and does not confuse them. 19

188. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 29, at § 2.8.
189. In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 6, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1926) (definition by Judge Cardozo).
190. Comment, Preventing the Importationand Sale of Genuine Goods BearingAmericanOwned Trademarks:ProtectinganAmericanGoodwill, 35 Mu. L. REv. 315,320-21 n.35 (1983).
191. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 691-92 (1923).
192. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 29, at §§ 3.1-3.5.
193. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 174-95 and accompanying text.
197. Note, supra note 21, at 855.
198. See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
199. Note, supra note 21, at 857-61.
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Although a trademark confers an exclusive right upon its owner,0
grey marketeers maintain that a trademark does not grant an anti-competitive monopoly.21 According to those favoring the Customs regulations, literally enforcing section 526 allows "anti-competitive practices,
discriminating pricing and violations of antitrust law and policy."2
Permitting grey market goods to flow in American commerce provides
consumers with lower prices and simultaneously eliminates the
2 4
trademark owners' illegal203 monopolization of the market. 0
Both American trademark owners and grey marketeers have realistic concerns regarding this dilemma. Trademark owners desire protection which United States trademark laws provide, while grey marketeers want a competitive marketplace. Mark owners further want
to continue the territoriality principle espoused in Katzel and the contemporary cases supporting literal enforcement of section 526.205 In
contrast, grey marketeers want courts to follow the universality principle which, although replaced in Katzel, the present Customs regulations somewhat revive.2 The United States Supreme Court in
COPIAT must examine these two equally important contentions and,
by applying the theories advanced in the Osawa dictum,-,, Vivitarm
COPIAT,2°9 and Olympus,210 create a feasible compromise that satisfies
each party.
C.

What the Supreme Court Should Do: COPIAT

COPIAT provides the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to develop a reasonable solution to the grey market con-

200. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 29, at § 2.5.
201. Note, supra note 21, at 857.
202. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
203. Grey marketeers claim that trademark owners' monopolies are illegal because they
violate the Sherman Act. See supra note 86.
204. Note, supra note 21, at 857-61.
205. For a discussion of Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
(COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986), see
supranotes 141-55 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of Vivitar v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986), see supranotes 130-40 and accompanying text, and for a discussion
of Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), see supra notes 156-68 and
accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
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flict. 211 The case offers the first contemporary opportunity to address
the parallel importation issue.212 Initially, the Court must balance the
opposing sides' policy arguments, 213 which will likely result in a stalemate since neither side has stronger policy concerns. 214 Thus, the

Court's decision should analyze decisions that examine the Customs
regulations.215
Favoring the section 526 policy arguments over the Customs regulations' policies results in a deadlock. With the regulations in effect,
American consumers receive maximum competition and, therefore,
lower priced goods. 216 However, consumers also suffer by purchasing
grey market products lacking warranty service American distributors

provide.2 17 Additionally,

grey marketeers

free ride 218

on the

United States trademarks, receiving advertising and other promotional

benefits without cost. 219 Conversely, completely removing parallel imports from the American marketplace enables United States trademark
owners a market monopoly, removing the consumers' freedom of choice
and lower priced merchandise.22° Based on policies, neither section 526
supporters nor Customs regulations advocates have a stronger posi-

tion.2 1 Because of this policy stalemate, the Court in COPIAT must
base its decision on legal theories found in Vivitar,- COPIATm and

Olympus.=

211. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 861-65 (offering a number of alternative solutions);
Note, supra note 12, at 111-15 (reviewing six proposed solutions).
212. The COPIAT court stated that "Itihe issues raised in this case are matters of first
impression.. . ." Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of United States Trademarks (COPIAT)
v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
213. For a discussion of the preliminary policy discussions, see supra text accompanying
notes 174-210.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
216. Comment, supra note 4, at 265-68.
217. Id. at 266-67.
218. Note, supra note 12, at 86. Free riding arises in situations where advertising or other
pre-sale or post-sale efforts are part of the sale. Id. at 86 n.9 (citing P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
503, at 647 (3d ed. 1981)).
ANALYSIS,
219. Note, supra note 12, at 86 n.9.
220. Note, supra note 21, at 855-61.
221. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's solution should minimize the harm to
trademark goodwill 2 while maximizing the competitive market.226 The
Vivitar, COPIAT, and Olympus opinions disagree whether Customs
has the authority to issue regulations interpreting section 526.27 Vivitar and COPIAT present similar analyses of the history and interpretations of section 526.m The Vivitar court stated that the regulations
were a valid act of administrative enforcement.229 The COPIAT court
also held that Customs could issue regulations,9o but only if they
interpreted the statute's requirements.3 1 The Olympus court offered
a third view of the regulations, stating that Congress, through its
lack of reaction to the Customs regulations, had silently acquiesced
to Customs' actions.2 32 Apparently, COPIAT correctly held that Customs possessed the power to interpret the requirements of section
526, but Customs overstepped this power by issuing regulations inconsistent with both the express wording and legislative intent of the
statute.23 By addressing concepts not contemplated in the statute's
wording or intent, Customs exceeded its authority. Without this extension into areas untouched by Congress, the Vivitar court accurately
held that the Customs regulations are a proper exercise of agency
discretion. 3 But delving into issues without congressional consent
eliminated any possibility of Customs exercising its discretion. The
Vivitar court adequately discarded the Olympus court statement regarding Congress' implied acquiescence through silence.2 Although
Congress examined the grey market area, "[1]egislation by total silence
is too tenuous a theory to merit extended discussion. ' ' Based on this
analysis, the Supreme Court should invalidate the Customs regula2

tions.

7

225. For a discussion of the importance of goodwill, see supranotes 187-91 and accompanying
text.
226. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
228. Lipner, supra note 12, at 109.
229. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
230. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
231. Id.
232. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320-21 (2d Cir. 1986).
233. See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
235. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
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Solutions the Supreme Court Should Suggest to Congress

Invalidating the Customs regulations, however, is not enough. The
Court should end the grey market dilemma by proposing an answer
which Congress can amend to section 526. A number of commentators
suggest that parallel imports carry labels stating that items such as
warranty service are not included with the sale of the goods.m However, this is a harsh requirement for grey marketeers. Labels with
statements such as 'WARRANTY SERVICE DOES NOT ACCOMPANY THE SALE OF THIS PRODUCT" are extremely negative
and would deter consumers despite the discount price. Two alternative
solutions, similar to this labeling requirement but not as severe, are
presented below as potential answers to the conflict.
The first alternative solution requires grey marketeers to incur
the cost of placing labels on the exclusive American distributors' products.2 9 This requirement would cost the grey marketeer approximately
the same amount as labeling its own goods, but a label on the American
product stating "THIS PRODUCT WAS MANUFACTURED FOR
SALE IN THE UNITED STATES" merely advances the competitive
mandate which the parallel importation supporters advocate.
Although this solution appears theoretically sound, implementation
could cause problems. Notifying the exclusive American distributors
would be time-consuming, and grey marketeers would likely avoid
notifying their competitors. Therefore, codifying this potential solution
necessitates including requirements covering these obstacles.
A second possible solution is to allow the free market to control
itself. Under this approach, parallel import retailers would be required
to post signs in their stores. These signs would inform consumers that
they are purchasing grey market goods at discount prices because the
product is not covered by warranty service. Such signs avoid consumer
confusion or deception regarding the products' source while providing
the grey marketeer with an opportunity to compete within United
States borders. Absent the display of such information, the grey market retailer would be required to warrant products it sells to the
public without disclosure. This penalty would eliminate goodwill injury
while still allowing competition. Nevertheless, similar to the solution
requiring parallel import labeling, the store displays could create an

238.

See supra note 211.

239.

The New York Legislature recently adopted a statute addressing the labeling issue.

See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 218aa (Consol. Supp. 1986). This law requires disclosing lack of

a manufacturer's warranty, lack of instructions in English, or lack of eligibility for a rebate.
Id. This law, however, is limited to articles used for personal, family, or household purposes. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/5

22

Friedland: Trademark Law: The Wacky World of Grey Market Goods: Untangling t
TRADEMARK LAW

unreasonable burden for grey market retailers. However, requiring
parallel import retailers to post signs provides the most reasonable
means of informing consumers while simultaneously maintaining a competitive marketplace.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the century-old conflict over parallel importation reaches a
climax in the Supreme Court, the Court must first affirm the COPIAT
decisions and invalidate the Customs regulations interpreting section
526. These regulations are concerned with an issue not contemplated
in either the statute's language or intent, and therefore wrongfully
extend Customs' authority. Once these regulations are eliminated, the
Court should suggest to Congress solutions to the grey market goods
conflict. Several potential answers exist. If the Court suggests one of
the solutions, it will likely end the parallel importation crisis.
David K. Friedland

Author's Note: On March 15, 1988, after this Note went to press, the United States Supreme
Court held that federal district courts have jurisdiction over parallel importation cases. 56 USLW
4219. The Court further decided that before determining the merits of the COPIAT case,
additional oral arguments were necessary. Id. These arguments were scheduled for Tuesday,
April 26, 1988.
On May 31, 1988, the Supreme Court decided that most of the Customs Regulations concerning parallel imports were valid. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1)
and (2) as consistent interpretations of § 526, and in a different 5-4 decision, the Court invalidated
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (3). 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1987. Justice Scalia, in a strong dissent, argued that
the regulations were invalid, stating that they clearly conflicted with § 526. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1912. Justice Scalia further stated that the Court had created law which the Customs Service
would not be able to enforce. The majority decision held that merchandise manufactured overseas
by a subsidiary of an American corporation is not "merchandise of foreign manfacture" under
§ 526 of the Tariff Act. However, the Customs Service has no means for identifying corporate
ownership, which "is often a closely guarded secret." Id. at 1914. Thus, it appears that the
Court's "solution" has created a new dilemma.
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